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Abstract
A large portion of school and college places in the world are allocated through cen-
tralized admissions schemes. In this paper, we study a model of centralized admissions
with the feature that schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified appli-
cants who rank them as top choice over more qualified applicants who do not. We
identify two motives for doing so. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment
to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (stealing
motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants
from being stolen (preemptive motive). We show the conditions for such motives to
exist, and in doing so, illustrate the roles of school popularity, difference in schools’
preferences, and relative school size.
Keywords : centralized admissions, commitment, endogenous preferential treatment,
manipulation
1 Introduction
A significant number of school and college places are allocated through centralized admission
schemes. In places where such schemes exist, instead of filing separate applications to
different schools, students need to file only a single application (a priority list) through
which they indicate their preferences among schools that they are interested in; schools then
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allocate their places in accordance with a strict protocol, taking into account applicants’
reported preferences as well as all other available information. Examples abound. It is
common for commonwealth countries to assign their university places in this manner based
on students’ performance in public examinations (e.g., UK and its former colony, Hong
Kong). China runs a gigantic national college admissions programme in which a few million
college places are allocated every year (Table 21-2, Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2006). In
the US, school choice programs have become popular since the late 80’s through which public
junior school places are assigned. Unlike the traditional system in which school places are
assigned strictly according to where students reside, the new school choice programs allow a
much greater variety of schools for students’ choosing (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So˝nmez,
2003).1
In this context of centralized admissions, we are interested in a phenomenon in which
a school gives preferential treatment to applicants who rank it as top choice over more
qualified applicants who do not. Such preferential treatment may be an intrinsic feature of
the admissions scheme being used. For instance, in the so called Boston admission scheme
(Ergin and So˝nmez, 2006; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So˝nmez, 2005, 2006), school
places are first assigned according to applicants’ top choice. This means that an applicant
failing to get into her top choice will also fail in getting into her second choice school if the
latter school has already filled up its places with applicants ranking it as their top choice—
even though the applicant may be much better than many of the latter. In other cases,
however, the preferential treatment may be just a deliberate choice of the school, rather
than an intrinsic feature of the admissions scheme. In China, a university normally deduces
30 to 50 points of public examination score2 from an applicant who does not rank it as top
choice when comparing her vis-a-vis other applicants who do; alternatively, the university
may pre-set a quota of 5%, say, for non-top choice applicants. This is so despite the fact that
China’ admissions scheme has no stipulations of such. It is this second type of preferential
treatment that our paper will focus on.
Regarding why schools may deliberately choose to adopt the practise, we can think of
two reasons. First, students’ motivations and commitments are important to success in
their studies, as is true in other endeavours. If a school cares about the success of its
students in studies and future career, it may want to give preferential treatment during
admissions to those who are genuinely more enthusiastic. In contrast with this motivational
consideration, a school may adopt the policy out of a strategic consideration. If preferential
treatment helps sway applicants to specify the school as their top choice and if this effect is
strong enough, the school may eventually admit a better group of students. Thus, it is in the
1 It is worthwhile pointing out that, in each place mentioned, alongside with the centralized admissions
schemes, there are also separate channels (such as early admissions programmes) through which students
can get admitted. These channels normally play an auxillary role, allocating a much smaller number of
places each year. We will ignore these alternative channels in our analysis.
2Based on raw public exam score that ranges from a low of zero to a high of 750.
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interest of the school to adopt the practise despite no intrinsic interest in each applicant’s
ranking of schools. In this paper we assume this latter strategic consideration, rather than
the former motivational consideration. We think that this is operationally easier and, more
importantly, closest to standard assumptions in this literature, allowing us a benchmark for
comparison and with which to start further studies.3
The baseline model that we study is the Gale-Shapley mechanism (Gale and Shapley
1962), but we allow schools to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank it as
their top choice. We call such a policy as the immediate acceptance (IA) policy, in contrast
with the deferred acceptance (DA) policy inherent in the Gale-Shapley mechanism.4 More
specifically, we consider a three-stage game. First, schools –or school place offering units–
announce publicly if they pre-commit to an IA policy. Then, applicants report their rankings
of schools, followed by assignment of places in accordance with the Gale-Shapley mechanism
subject to constraints of schools’ pre-commitments. Throughout the paper, we assume that,
albeit strategic, schools are credulous; it is so perhaps because schools are honest, or simply
because reputational concerns are strong enough as an enforcement device.
Our first finding is a neutrality result, which roughly says the following. So long as the
outcome in the game in which all schools have DA policies is deterministic and commonly
known, no schools would gain from adopting IA. Exactly the same outcome, in terms of who
enters what school, would result. Simple as it seems, this result suggests that uncertainty is
essential for understanding the role of IA behind its strategic use. In light of this, we study
two types of uncertainty: demand uncertainty and ranking uncertainty.
In the demand uncertainty model, applicants are uncertain about others’ genuine de-
mands, i.e., others’ preferences for places at different schools. This captures scenarios in
which applicants may not be sure of the latest fads regarding whether computer science or
business, say, is hot this year. In the ranking uncertainty model, applicants do not know
how well they are ranked among themselves. This model captures the scenario in which
applicants are required to apply before learning the exam results or even before taking ex-
aminations. To a certain extent, it also captures the scenario in which applicants are grouped
into large indifferent classes because of coarse public examination scores; uncertainty about
the tie-breaking outcome can be viewed as uncertainty in the rankings of applicants among
themselves.5
By studying the two models, we identify two motives for pre-commitment. A school
3Evidence of the motivational consideration, from educators and counselors, is not difficult to find. After
a change in the New York city’s school choice program in 2004, an administrator complained that the
information about how an applicant ranked a school was no longer available to the school and argued that it
was important that the information be released. He said, "we want the students that want us most." (New
York Times, November 29, 2004) We would like to thank Atila Adulkadiroglu for pointing out this source
to us.
4We do not consider other types of preferential treatments because the one that we study is the most
extreme one and presumably serves as the best starting point.
5The GCE exam, or its equivalence, that is normally taken in commonwealth countries gives only a letter
grade or subgrade for each course taken. This leads to large indifferent classes.
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may use the IA to steal applicants who otherwise would not have made it their top choice
(the stealing motive). A less popular school is more likely to have a stealing motive when
it is not too inferior to a popular school in terms of the utility that enrolled students can
obtain. On the other hand, rarely will a popular school have this motive. Under more
restricted conditions, the popular school does have a motive to use IA (the preemptive
motive). Although not helping to steal applicants, the IA is attractive because it can
prevent the less popular school from using IA and whereby protecting the popular school
from being hurt. We show the conditions for such motives to exist and relate them to school
popularity, difference in schools’ preferences, and relative school size. We also find that
being able to influence applicants’ behavior need not imply an improvement in the school’s
average student quality. IA can be influential yet self-defeating. Although our results are
obtained in a two school setting, we think that the basic insights identified here should
prevail in a more general setting.
The paper by Gale and Shapley has generated a large literature on matching and market
design. Later work shows that under the deferred acceptance mechanism, some schools may
have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences (Roth 1989; Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
So˝nmetz (1997) show that hospitals may benefit from misreporting their capacities; the
same can be said about schools because of the similarity between school-student matching
and hospital-medical intern matching. Despite this, in all of these studies, applicants still
have truthful reporting as their dominant strategy. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So˝nmez (2003)
are the first to extend the studies to school choice problems in which schools are neither
economic agents nor strategic. Reforms in real world social choice problems are being
implemented in Boston and New York City. The paper on Boston school choice problem
by Ergin and So˝nmetz (2006) is closest to us. There they characterize the equilibrium for a
centralized admissions scheme in which preferential treatment is an intrinsic feature, rather
than school’s strategic choice. Issues such as the presence of large indifferent groups–a quite
common feature that is ignored in earlier literature which is limited to strict preferences–
has prompted theoretical studies on the role of different tie-breaking rules and designs
of better mechanisms (see Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth 2006 and Erdil and Ergin,
forthcoming).6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model in which
the IA policy is irrelevant. Section 3 describes a modified model with demand uncertainty
and analyzes the case of homogenous school preferences, and Section 4 generalizes the results
to heterogeneous school preferences. Section 5 studies a model in which each applicant is
uncertain about his or her relative ranking with respect to other applicants. Section 6
presents a discussion and Section 7 concludes the paper.
6 In addition to school choice and college admission problems, mechanisms like those of Gale and Shapley
have been put into practice in, for instance, the resident program in the US, where medical residents are
assigned hospital places (Roth and Rothblum, 1984; Roth and Peranson 1999; Roth 1991).
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2 Model
A mass of applicants of size N are competing to enter two schools. Each applicant is indexed
by an ability attribute pair (y1, y2), where y1 may be her math score and y2 her language
score, for example. (y1, y2)’s are distributed over [0, 1] × [0, 1] with a cumulative function
F , which is continuous and has no mass point. Each applicant’s ability pair, as well as, F ,
is commonly known, and as such she knows her exact ranking vis-a-vis other applicants.
Given attribute pair (y1, y2), a fraction μ1 of applicants view school 1 as the better school:
the utility of attending the two schools is, respectively, u1 and u2, where u1 > u2 > 0; a
fraction, μ2 = 1− μ1, of applicants view school 2 as better: the utility of attending the two
schools are v1 and v2, where 0 < v1 < v2. We call the former group of applicants type 1
applicants and the second group type 2 applicants.
The two schools have places, s1 and s2, where s1 + s2 < N . We assume that school
1 is relatively more popular, i.e., μ1/s1 > μ2/s2. Occasionally, we will call school 1 the
popular school and school 2 the less popular school. School i’s preferences are represented
by a parameter αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. School i strictly prefers applicant a with attribute pair
(ya1 , y
a
2 ) over applicant b with attribute pair (y
b
1, y
b
2) if and only if y
a
1 + αiy
a
2 < y
b
1 + αiy
b
2;
hence, the smaller the attribute pair the better. We assume that, without loss of generality,
α1 ≤ α2, i.e., school 1 places more emphasis on attribute 1 than on attribute 2 as compared
with school 2. When α1 = α2, the two schools have identical preferences; when α1 < α2, the
two schools may differ as to which of two applicants is better. Given a group of applicants
characterized by cumulative function H(y1, y2), their average quality for school i isR
[0,1]×[0,1] (y1 + αiy2) dH(y1, y2)R
[0,1]×[0,1] dH(y1, y2)
. (1)
Given two groups of applicants with the same mass, characterized by cumulative functions
H1(y1, y2) and H2(y1, y2), school i prefers the former group to the latter group if and only
if, for school i, the former group’s average quality is better (i.e., is lower) than that of the
latter group.
A centralized admissions scheme in the fashion of Gale and Shapley (1962) is in place;
each applicant is required to submit a priority list of schools–indicating whether she regards
school 1 as her first choice and school 2 as her second choice or vice versa. Before the
centralized admissions scheme actually operates, schools publicly announce which policy to
use: a deferred acceptance (DA) policy or an immediate acceptance (IA) policy. Under the
former, the school ranks applicants based solely on their quality attributes and processes
the applications strictly in accordance with the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the latter,
while still using the centralized admissions scheme, the school is committed to admitting
applicants who specify it as their top choice up to its capacity. We assume that schools
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are honest so that the commitment is genuine and credible. The game is identical to the
Gale-Shapley mechanism except that schools may pre-commit to an IA policy.
We use a pair (k, l), where k, l = DA, IA, to represent the policies used by the two
schools. Under (DA,DA), there exists an equilibrium in which all type 1 applicants report
school 1 as their top choice and all type 2 applicants report school 2 as their top choice.
The two schools then admit according to the standard Gale-Shapley procedure. We call the
strategies the truthful strategies, the equilibrium the truthful equilibrium, and the outcome
(in terms of who goes to what school) the truthful outcome. Making use of (1), we use
AQi(k, l) to denote school i’s equilibrium average quality under policy pair (k, l), where
i = 1, 2, and k, l = DA, IA.
2.1 An Irrelevance Result
We first report an irrelevance result (all proofs are relegated in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Suppose the truthful outcome under (DA,DA) is deterministic (no tie-breaking
rule is used in determining the truthful outcome) and is commonly known. Then, under any
policy pair (i,j) where at least one of i and j equals IA, the unique equilibrium outcome is
the truthful outcome.
Basically, foreseeing the impact of the IA policy, every applicant who enters some school
in the truthful equilibrium now puts that school–the applicant knows what the school
is–as his or her top choice. As such, the applicant succeeds in getting into the school,
and the effect of the IA policy is completely neutralized. It is clear that this constitutes
an equilibrium.7 Despite its success in affecting applicants’ reporting, the IA policy does
not bring improvement to the school in terms of the average quality of admitted applicants.
This irrelevance result is in fact very general and does not depend on the assumptions of two
schools and a continuum of applicants. The intuition is that, without uncertainty, applicants
are able to replicate the same outcome by optimally misreporting their preferences. We will
next turn to two models of uncertainty that make IA relevant.
3 Demand Uncertainty with Identical School Prefer-
ences (α1 = α2)
Here we assume that applicants are uncertain about the state of the world that determines
applicants’ preferences. We call this a model of demand uncertainty. There are two states
7The uniqueness of equilibrium comes from the stability of the truthful outcome, a well known result in
the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
6
of the world, state 1 and state 2, with respective probabilities, π1 and π2 ≡ 1 − π1. We
assume that
μ11/μ
1
2 > μ
2
1/μ
2
2 > s1/s2 (2)
where μji ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of applicants who prefers under state j school i to the
other school. That is, school 1 is still more popular than school 2 under each state, but its
popularity is less overwhelming under state 2. We study the same game described in the
last section, except that, prior to the game, there is an additional stage in which the true
state is realized (but not revealed to agents). We assume that schools are (von Neunman
Morgenstern) expected average quality minimizers, i.e., school i ’s objective is to minimize
AQi ≡ π1AQ1i + π2AQ2i , where AQ
j
i is school i’s average quality in state j.
3.1 Unilateral Incentive
To see why demand uncertainty may enable IA to become relevant, we focus on the simplest
case in which α1 = α2 = 0: both schools have identical preferences and do not care about
the y2 attribute. We further assume that y1 is uniformly distributed. Under (DA,DA), type
i applicants will specify school i as their top choice, i = 1, 2. Because of (2), in equilibrium,
school 1 will only admit type 1 applicants, setting a cutoff value, c11 = s1/μ11N , in state 1
and a more lenient cutoff value, c21 = s1/μ21N , in state 2. School 2, on the other hand, sets
the same cutoff value, c12 = c22 = (s1+ s2)/N , in both states, admitting all type 2 applicants
satisfying this condition as well as all type 1 applicants satisfying this condition who have
been declined by school 1 (see Figure 1).
Given this benchmark, it is transparent that school 2 may want to use IA, for the purpose
of altering the behavior of those type 1 applicants with y1 ∈ S ≡
¡
s1/μ11N, s1/μ21N
¢
(i.e.,
applicants in Region A in Figure 1), who are uncertain about which school they will enter
under (DA,DA). If π2u1 < u2, there no longer exists a truthful equilibrium under (DA,IA),
for the following reason. Given that all others follow their truthful strategies, any type 1
applicant with y1 ∈ S will benefit from a unilateral deviation to choosing school 2 as her top
choice. As such, the applicant is guaranteed a place in school 2 in both states, resulting in
a utility of u2. By following the truthful strategy, however, the applicant will be admitted
by school 1 in state 2 and not by any school in state 1, resulting in a lower utility of π2u1.
It is easy to verify that a non-truthful equilibrium exists in which (i) all type 1 applicants
with y1 ∈ S specify school 2 as their top choice, and (ii) all type 1 applicants with y1 <
s1/μ11N , as well as all type 2 applicants, report truthfully (other applicants’ strategies
are inconsequential). In this equilibrium, the state 1 outcome is exactly the same as in
the truthful equilibrium. Under state 2, nonetheless, school 2 is able to admit the type
1 applicants with y1 ∈ S, setting a more stringent cutoff at y1 = (s1 + s2) /N − x, where
7
y10
A
B
c21=c22=(s1+s2)/N
N
c11=s1/µ11N c12=s1/µ12N
1
µ12N
µ22N
(s1+s2)/N-x
Density of Applicants
x
Figure 1: Under (DA,DA), the two schools set cutoffs, cj1 and c
j
2, in state j, j = 1, 2. In case
π2u1 < u2, by switching to IA, school 2 steals in state 2 type 1 applicants in Region A from
school 1, giving up applicants in Region B whereby.
x ≡ (s1/N)
¡
1− μ21/μ11
¢
; diagrammatically, school 2 replaces students in Region B, ie., those
applicants with y1 ∈ T ≡ ((s1 + s2) /N − x, (s1 + s2) /N), by better students in Region A
(see Figure 1). Thus, school 2 is strictly better off.
In other words, through the IA policy, school 2 is able to steal good type 1 students from
school 1, and this is why school 2 may benefit from the policy. The stealing effect does not
always exist, however. When π2u1 > u2, school 2’s IA policy is unable to persuade type 1
applicants with y1 ∈ S to make school 2 their top choice. As a result, neither are these
students stolen by school 2 in state 2, even worse, because of the pre-commitment, nor are
they admitted by school 2 in state 1–school 2 has to admit poorer applicants to fill the
vacancies. School 2 is thereby worse off as a whole, and the IA policy is self-defeating.8
The analysis of the effect of school 1’s IA is more straightforward. Since under (DA,DA)
school 1 already sets a more stringent admissions requirement, those type 2 applicants whom
school 1 is interested in stealing must be good enough to enter school 2–their preferred
school–and have no incentive to change their behavior under (IA,DA). As a result, the
truthful outcome prevails under (IA,DA), and school 1 never benefits from using IA when
the other school does not use it. This asymmetry between school 1 and school 2 that school
1 is less likely to benefit from a stealing motive appears repeatedly in the paper.
8 In this case, school 2’s IA policy is still influential, but only for those poorer students. One can show
that, in equilibrium, all type 1 students with y1 ∈ ((s1 + s2)/N, (s1 + s2)/N + x) now make school 2 their
top choice and will be admitted by the school in state 1.
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Proposition 2 (unilateral incentive) Suppose that α1 = α2 = 0 and that y1 is uniformly
distributed between [0, 1].
1. Suppose that π2u1 < u2 (π2u1 > u2). Under (DA,IA), (a) there does not exist a
truthful equilibrium, and (b) there exists an equilibrium in which school 2’s admitted
applicants’ average quality is improved (worsened) compared with under (DA,DA).
2. (IA,DA) and (DA,DA) are outcome equivalent.
Proof. Omitted.
A few comments are in order here. First, given μ11 and starting from μ
2
1 = μ
1
1, the
number of applicants that are affected by school 2’s IA increases as μ21 decreases. That
is, starting with no demand uncertainty, an increase in the difference between μ11 and μ21
always increases the number of applicants whose behavior is affected. Second, whenever
school 2 experiences an improvement of its average quality through using IA, school 1
experiences a worsening whereby. This is a straightforward result from the fact that the
two schools have identical preferences for applicants. Third, some applicants are better off
under (DA,IA) than under (DA,DA). Those type 1 applicants in region B now get into
school 1 in state 2 under (DA,IA), while they can only get into school 2 under (DA,DA).9
Relatedly, we also note that these type 1 applicants have a higher expected utility compared
with their slightly more qualified counterparts (with slightly lower y1), who also adopt the
same strategy. Somewhat ironically, just because the latter group is of better quality and
is selected by school 2–their top choice but less preferred school–the former group is able
to get into their school 1.
3.2 Competition
We now study the equilibrium when both schools are allowed to pre-commit. We restrict
our attention to equilibrium in which schools play only pure strategies. If π2u1 > u2,
then it follows from the previous analysis that there are only two, outcome-equivalent, pure
strategy equilibria, (DA,DA) and (IA,DA). The more interesting case is where π2u1 < u2,
where school 2 strictly benefits from using IA provided that school 1 does not use it. In this
case, we have
AQ1(IA,DA) = AQ1(DA,DA), (3)
and
AQ2(DA, IA) < AQ2(DA,DA). (4)
9Thus, it is not the case that school 2’s IA policy will be universally opposed by all applicants.
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(IA,DA) is an equilibrium if it is also true that
AQ2(IA,DA) < AQ2(IA, IA), (5)
which means that, by using IA, school 1 can deter school 2 from using IA. We say that
(IA,DA) is a preemptive equilibrium for school 1 if (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied. It is indeed
the unique equilibrium (restricting to equilibria in which no dominated strategies are played)
if it is also true that
AQ1(IA, IA) ≤ AQ1(DA, IA); (6)
otherwise, there will exist another pure strategy equilibrium: (DA,IA).
Assuming (3) and (4), whether a preemptive equilibrium exists depends on whether
or not (5) holds, or whether or not AQ2(IA, IA) − AQ2(IA,DA) > 0. Since (IA,DA) is
outcome equivalent to (DA,DA), the difference can be decomposed into two components, in
the following way:
AQ2(IA, IA)−AQ2(IA,DA)
= (AQ2(IA, IA)−AQ2(DA, IA)) + (AQ2(DA, IA)−AQ2(DA,DA)) (7)
where, according to (4), the second term in right-hand side is negative. To see when (7)
is positive, it suffices to focus on the first term in the right-hand side, i.e., to study how
school 2’s average quality is changed from (DA,IA) to (IA,IA). Recall that under (DA,IA),
in equilibrium, applicants with y1 < (s1 + s2) /N−x are admitted by the same school under
both states; thus any new threat due to school 1’s IA will not alter their behavior. However,
it is not the case for applicants with y1 ∈ T because they are admitted by different schools
in different states. Now, they must choose between being admitted by school 2 in state 1
and not admitted by any school in state 2, on the one hand, and being admitted by school
1 in state 2 and not admitted by any school in state 1, on the other.
Since the respective utilities from the two choices are π1u2 and π2u1 for type 1 applicants
and π1v2 and π2v1 for type 2 applicants, to understand these applicants’ optimal strategies,
we need to consider three cases. If π1u2 > π2u1 (implying π1v2 > π2v1), all applicants
specify school 2 as their top choice. School 2’s student quality under (IA,IA) is just the
same as under (DA,IA). Substituting AQ2(IA, IA) − AQ2(DA, IA) = 0 into (7), we find
that (7) is negative and, as a result, there does not exist any preemptive equilibrium. If
u1/u2 > π1/π2 > v1/v2, while those type 1 applicants will specify school 1 as their top
choice, those type 2 applicants will specify school 2 as their top choice. Because of the
pre-commitment, school 1 now need to admit less qualified applicants to replace the latter
group. Thus a worsening relative to (DA,IA), or (6) is violated. Hence, (DA,IA) must be
an equilibrium, whether or not any preemptive equilibrium exists. Finally, if π1v2 < π2v1,
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all applicants will specify school 1 as their top choice. Then school 1 gets exactly the same
applicants under (IA,IA) as under (DA,IA), and (6) is satisfied. Hence, if a preemptive
equilibrium ever exists, it is also the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (competition) Suppose that α1 = α2 = 0 and that y1 is uniformly distributed
between [0, 1].
1. If π2u1 > u2, there are only two pure strategy equilibria: (DA,DA) and (IA,DA). They
both lead to the same truthful outcome.
2. Suppose that π2u1 < u2.
(a) If π1u2 > π2u1, there is a unique equilibrium of (DA,IA).
(b) If u1/u2 > π1/π2 > v1/v2, (DA,IA) is an equilibrium, and there may exist
another equilibrium, (IA,DA).
(c) If π1v2 < π2v1, there is a unique equilibrium: either (DA,IA) or (IA,DA).
Proof. Omitted.
To check if a preemptive equilibrium really exists, we first consider the scenario where
π1v2 < π2v1. Under (IA,IA), by specifying school 1 as their top choice, all applicants with
y1 ∈ T give up the opportunity to enter school 2 in state 1, and school 2 must admit an equal
number of applicants to replace them in this state. It is clear that applicants of both types
with y1 ∈ U ≡ ((s1 + s2) /N, (s1 + s2) /N + x) are replacements in equilibrium (highlighted
as shaded region C in Figure 2).
The change in school 2’s average quality can be represented as follows:
∆ ≡ AQ2(IA, IA)−AQ2(IA,DA)
= π1 [n(C)m(C)− n(B)m(B)] + π2 [n(A)m(A)− n(B)m(B)] , (8)
where n(.) and m(.) are the number and the average quality of the applicants in the region
concerned, and regions A, B, and C are depicted in Figure 2. Relative to (IA,DA), school 2’s
average quality worsens in state 1 and improves in state 2: in state 1, applicants in Region
B are replaced by applicants in Region C; in state 2, applicants in Region B are replaced by
applicants in Region A. If the state 1 effect dominates, there will be a worsening of school
2’s overall average quality. In other words, if ∆ > 0, a preemptive equilibrium exists. The
analysis is simplified by the fact that the number of applicants, as well as their average
quality, in each region is independent of π1 and π2.
Proposition 4 Suppose that u2 > π2u1 and π1v2 < π2v1. Then there exist parameter
values such that ∆ > 0 (i.e., a preemptive equilibrium exists) if and only if s2/s1 < 2π1/π2.
11
Panel a: 
State 1
Panel b: 
State 2
Density of Applicants
y10
A
B
(s1+s2)/N
N
s1/µ11N s1/µ12N
1
µ12N
µ22N
Density of Applicants
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s1/µ11N s1/µ12N
1
µ11N
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x x
Figure 2: The shaded regions show the change in admitted students that school 2 will
encounter when the policy changes from (IA,DA) to (IA,IA).
There are two ways to understand the condition s2/s1 < 2π1/π2. First, given that the
other parameters are unchanged and given s1, the greater s2, the less likely that a preemptive
equilibrium exists. Comparing (IA,IA) with (IA,DA), we find that school 2’s loss in state 1
is invariant to s2 but its gain in state 2 is increasing in s2. Hence, when s2 is sufficiently
large, IA is so attractive to school 2 that its use is never thwarted. Second, π1/π2 has to
be sufficiently large for ∆ > 0. The reason is that the greater the likelihood of state 1,
the greater weight we put on state 1’s effect, which is favorable for ∆ > 0. To get more
concrete ideas, suppose that u2/u1 = v1/v2 = 0.8. Then, there always exist parameters of a
preemptive equilibrium when s2/s1 < 1.6 and never exist when s2/s1 > 2.5.
We next study the scenario when u1/u2 > π1/π2 > v1/v2 and check if a preemptive
equilibrium really exists. The equilibrium student intakes for school 2 under (IA,IA) are
depicted as shaded regions in Figure 3.10 Note that, in state 1, those in region C are
admitted to replace those type 1 applicants in Region B’ who, with school 1 as their top
10As depicted, Region C consists of both type 1 and type 2 applicants. It is, however, possible, that it
consists solely of type 2 applicants. This is the case when applicants in Region B’ is not too numerous so
that they can be completely replaced by type 2 applicants.
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Figure 3: The shaded regions show that school 2 admits in equilibrium under (IA,IA).
Region B’ refers to those type 1 applicants with y1 ∈ T.
choice, are not admittable. Also note that in state 2 school 2 admits exactly the same
applicants as under (DA,IA). The change in average quality for school 2 can be written as
Γ ≡ AQ2(IA, IA)−AQ2(IA,DA)
= π1 [n(C)m(C)− n(B0)m(B0)] + π2 [n(A)m(A)− n(B)m(B)] , (9)
where the first term on the right-hand side is positive and the second term is negative. If
the first term dominates, then the overall student quality is worsened. Again, the analy-
sis is simplified by the fact that in each region the number of applicants, as well as the
corresponding average quality , is invariant to π1 and π2.
Proposition 5 Suppose that u2 > π2u1 and u1/u2 > π1/π2 > v1/v2. Then there exist
parameter values such that Γ > 0 (a preemptive equilibrium exists) if
s2
s1
<
μ11
1− μ11
π1
π2
. (10)
Here is an example. Suppose that s1 = s2 = 0.25, N = 1, μ11 = 1, μ21 = 0.6. Then
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any v1, v2, u1, u2 satisfying 0.6 > u2/(u1 + u2) will ensure a preemptive equilibrium. The
intuition behind the roles of s2/s1 and of π1/π2 is analogous to that in Proposition 4 and
is not repeated. Note that unlike in Proposition 4, (10) is only a sufficient condition, rather
than a sufficient and necessary condition. Thus violation of (10) does not necessarily mean
the non-existence of preemptive equilibrium.
3.3 Summary
We have identified two motives for using IA. A school may use it to steal applicants who
otherwise would not put it as their top choice. We call this the stealing motive. Being able
to influence applicants’ behavior, however, need not imply an improvement of the school’s
average quality: IA can be influential yet self-defeating. While the popular school does not
have the stealing motive, the less popular school does so long as it is not too inferior to
the popular school from applicants’ point of view. We have also identified the preemptive
motive, whereby the popular school uses IA to thwart the less popular school from adopting
its own IA. In particular, a preemptive equilibrium exists if s2/s1 is small enough. On the
contrary, when s2/s1 is sufficiently large, provided that u2/u1 is not too low, the less popular
school has IA as its dominant strategy.
4 Demand Uncertainty with Heterogeneous School Pref-
erences (α1 6= α2)
We argue here that the insights discovered–that IA being influential is different from its
being advantageous, that there is asymmetry between the two schools regarding the steal-
ing motive, and that school 1 may have the preemptive motive–remain true when school
preferences are heterogeneous. As in the previous case, diagrammatic analysis proves to be
very useful. But in this case, the diagram we use is somewhat different, because both y1
and y2 are relevant and should be shown.
4.1 Benchmark
Under (DA,DA), the truthful outcome is characterized by a cutoff standard for each state
set by each school so that every applicant with a better attribute pair will be admitted
provided that she writes it as her top choice or, if not, she has been declined by her top
choice school. Referring to Figure 4, we use LLi, MMi to denote the cutoff lines set by
school 1 and school 2 under state i = 1, 2. There are three different possibilities regarding
the relative positions of these four lines. In Panel a, school 1 is so popular that, in the
truthful equilibrium, it never admits any type 2 applicant; as a result, school 2’s cutoffs are
the same under both states–as in the homogeneous school preferences case studied in the
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last Section. In Panel b, school 1 admits type 2 applicants only under state 2; in Panel c,
school 1 admits type 2 applicants under both states.
For i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, school i is said to be (i) dominant if in the truthful outcome
it never admits a type j applicant; (ii) semi-dominant if it admits some type j applicants
under only one state, and (iii) non-dominant if it admits some type j applicants under both
states. Clearly, school 1 is, respectively, dominant, semi-dominant, and non-dominant in
the first three panels depicted in Figure 4. It is also clear that school 2 cannot be dominant
and only school 1 can be. Moreover, given assumption (2), school 1 is always dominant if
α1 = α2. One can show that, given α1, there exist α and α, where α > α > α1, so that
school 1 is dominant if α2 ∈ [α1, α), semi-dominant if α2 ∈ (α, α), and non-dominant if
α2 ∈ (α,∞).
A
B
MM2
MM1
y1
y2
0 LL1 LL2
Panel b: school 1 is semi-dominant
1
1
y1
A
MM1=MM2
y2
0
LL1 LL2
Panel a: school 1 is dominant
1
1
MM2MM2’
A
BD MM1
y1
y2
0 LL1 LL2
LL2’
Panel c: school 1 is non-dominant
1
1
A
BD
MM2
MM1
y1
y2
0
MM1’
LL1 LL2
Panel d: school 1 is non-dominant
1
1
C
Figure 4: LL1 and LL2 (MM1 and MM2) are cutoffs set by school 1 (2) in the two states
under (DA,DA). Corresponding lines with asterisks are cutoffs under (DA,IA).
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4.2 Unilateral Incentive
The following Proposition, which is closely related to Proposition 2, can be obtained.
Proposition 6 Suppose that α1 6= α2 and (y1, y2) is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]× [0, 1].
1. Suppose that π2u1 < u2 (π2u1 > u2). Under (DA,IA), (a) there does not exist a
truthful equilibrium, and (b) there exists an equilibrium in which school 2’s average
quality is improved (worsened) compared with under (DA,DA).
2. (IA,DA) and (DA,DA) are outcome equivalent if school 1 is dominant or semi-dominant.
3. If school 1 is non-dominant and π1v2 < v1 (π1v2 > v1), then under (IA,DA) (a) there
does not exist a truthful equilibrium, and (b) there exists an equilibrium in which school
1’s average quality is improved (worsened) compared with under (DA,DA).
Proof. Omitted.
To understand result 1, recall from the previous section that the purpose of using IA for
school 2 is to steal those type 1 applicants who would otherwise enter different schools in
different states under (DA,DA). Exactly the same insight holds true here. Type 1 applicants
with attribute pairs in Region A in Panels a, b and c of Figure 4 are such applicants. If
π2u1 > u2, they do not deviate and school 2 suffers for having to replace them, in state
1, with poorer quality applicants that are not admitted under (DA,DA).11 If π2u1 < u2,
on the other hand, they are just as willing to deviate from truthful reporting as are their
counterparts under homogeneous preferences, rendering the truthful equilibrium infeasible.
We use the case of the non-dominant school 1 (Panel c of Figure 4) to illustrate the
equilibrium under (DA,IA); the analyses for the cases of dominance and semi-dominance
are similar. In state 1, the cutoff lines remain to be LL1 and MM1 as under (DA,DA); in
state 2, school 2’s cutoff line shifts down to MM 02 while school 1’s cutoff line shifts right to
LL02. Now that school 2 is able to admit good type 1 applicants that it otherwise does not
admit, its cutoff value is made more stringent, while school 1’s cutoff is relaxed.12
Now we turn to the second point. The argument is exactly the same as under the
homogeneous school preferences case. When school 1 is dominant or semi-dominant, there
does not exist a group of type 2 applicants who enter different schools in different states
under (DA,DA). As a result, school 1 cannot gain from using IA. When school 1 is non-
dominant (the third point), such a group does exist (region D in Panel c in Figure 4). Then
school 1 can break the truthful equilibrium by using IA and will indeed benefit from doing
so through the stealing effect when π1v2 < v1. Since the more apart α1 and α2 are the more
11As a result, school 2’s cutoff in state 1 will shift, say, to MM1’ in panel d of Figure 4.
12This outcome is supported by the following equilibrium strategies: (1) all type 1 applicants in the region
bounded by LL1, MM1, LL2 and the horizontal axis specify school 2 as their top choice, and (2) all type 1
applicants on the right-hand side of LL1, as well as all type 2 applicants, report truthfully (other applicants’
strategies are inconsequential).
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likely school 1 is non-dominant, this suggests a subtle role played by school preferences
divergence that determines if school 1 has the stealing effect.
A remark is in order here. Unlike in the homogeneous school preferences case, it is no
longer the case that whenever one school benefits from using IA, the other school will suffer
as a consequence. Applicants whom one school thinks not very good may now be considered
by the other as very good. Thus, the school that does not use the IA policy may admit
good applicants that it otherwise does not admit under (DA,DA). If this effect is significant
enough, the school may be made better off as well.
4.3 Competition
The previous subsection demonstrated identical results as under homogeneous school pref-
erences so long as school 1 is dominant or semi-dominant. This means that Proposition 3
continues to hold under heterogeneous school preferences so long as school 1 is dominant or
semi-dominant. Since a preemptive equilibrium presumably exists under some conditions,
we do not belabor to venture into the exact conditions here.
A new research question here is what the equilibrium is like when school 1 is non-
dominant and, in particular, when both schools each have an incentive to use IA given
that the other school does not use IA (i.e., π1v2 < v1 and π2u1 < u2). Our simulation
studies suggest that both schools using the IA policy is an equilibrium outcome in ample
environments. In the simulation, we assume that u2/u1 = v1/v2 = 0.8, s1 = s2 = 0.25, N =
1, α1 = 0, μ11 = 0.8.With these parameters, the necessary and sufficient condition for π1v2 <
v1, and π2u1 < u2 is π1 ∈ (0.2, 0.8). Two parameter values of α2 are used here, α2 = 1,
and α2 = 2, which are verified to ensure the non-dominance of school 1. We attempt on
two specifications for the distributions of (y1, y2): uniform distribution and a cumulative
function with associated density function g(y1, y2) = 1 + (2y1 − 1)(2y2 − 1).
Figure 5 reports the results in terms of parameter values of π1 and μ21.
13 Both schools
using IA is an equilibrium outcome for parameter values above, respectively, the CC curves
when density function g(.) is used and the NN curves when a uniform distribution is used.
For the case of α2 = 2, both using IA is an equilibrium outcome for all parameter values
of π1 and μ21 when g(.) is used and hence no NN curve is depicted. Some interesting
comparative statics are obtained: for both distributions, it is more likely for the outcome
to be viable when the divergence of school preferences is greater and when μ21 is large. The
first result is consistent with the partial mutual exchange of applicants pointed out in the
last subsection, while the insight into the second result is not straightforward. The bottom
line is clear though: there are ample scenarios in which both schools using IA can be an
equilibrium outcome.
13Though (2) implies that μ21 ≥ 0.5, our analysis in fact applies for μ21 < 0.5. We report a larger range of
μ21 here.
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Figure 5: Both schools using IA is an equilibrium if and only if μ21 and π1 are in the
respective region outside the CC curve (when y1 and y2 are positively correlated) and NN
curve (when y1 and y2 are uncorrelated).
5 Ranking Uncertainty
Here we study an alternative setting in which applicants are not informed of their attributes
or relative ranking. When applicants are required to specify their preferences before taking
their public exams (the scores of which will become their attributes), then there will be
information asymmetry between applicants and schools, which will make admission decisions
only after knowing the exam results. This is the case for several provinces in the Chinese
national college admissions system.14
We argue that this relative ranking uncertainty may also lead to strategic use of the IA
policy and yield similar insights regarding the stealing motive and the preemptive motive.
To make the point, we focus on a very simple version. Like in the previous model, there are
two schools with seats, s1 and s2, for which a mass of applicants of size N are competing.
The two schools’ preferences are represented by α1 = 0 and α2 ≥ α1. Each applicant is
14Each Chinese province runs its own admissions system for its resident students. Some provinces require
students to apply before they take the national examination; some require students to apply after they take
the exam while before they learn of their scores, the other require students to apply even after scores are
known. It should be noted that, since students in each province are competing only among themselves to
enter colleges with pre-determined places allotted to that province, they do not compete with students of
another province.
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characterized by an attribute pair (y1, y2) uniformly distributed over [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The
distribution function is commonly known, and schools know each applicant’s attribute pair
when evaluating applicants. Despite this, each applicant does not know her own attribute
pair (nor the attribute pair of any other applicant); in other words, each applicant is ex ante
identical. This is the quintessential case of ranking uncertainty.
To focus on the role of ranking uncertainty, we also assume that applicants have identical
preferences. For each applicant, the utility of attending school i is ui, i = 1, 2, so that
u1 > u2; the utility of not attending any school is zero. Occasionally, we will call school
1 the popular school and school 2 the less popular school. (Hence, there do not exist two
separate states of the world regarding demand. This assumption allows us to focus solely
on the role of ranking uncertainty.)
5.1 Identical School Preferences (α1 = α2)
5.1.1 Unilateral Incentive
We first study the case of identical school preferences, i.e., α1 = α2 = 0, and as such we can
represent each applicant’s attribute simply by her first attribute, y1. Under (DA,DA) the
equilibrium is such that all applicants make school 1 their top choice. It follows immediately
that school 1 never has the stealing motive. It is not be the case for school 2, however.
Suppose under (DA,IA) all applicants behave truthfully. Then each applicant can benefit
from deviating to make school 2 her top choice so long as u2/u1 is sufficiently high, and the
truthful equilibrium is infeasible. This means that in equilibrium a number of applicants
will specify school 2 as their top choice, and if this number (denoted by b) is large enough,
school 2 will indeed benefit from the IA policy. The equilibria under (DA,DA) and (DA,IA)
are shown in Figure 6, where a and b, respectively, is the corresponding number of applicants
who specify school 1 and school 2 as their top choice.
Proposition 7 (Unilateral incentive) Suppose that α1 = α2 = 0 and that y1 is distributed
uniformly over the [0,1] interval.
1. (IA,DA) and (DA,DA) are outcome equivalent.
2. Under (DA,IA), if u2/u1 < s1/(N − s2), there exists a truthful equilibrium.
3. Under (DA,IA), if u2/u1 > s1/(N − s2), then (a) there does not exist a truthful equi-
librium, but (b) there exists an equilibrium in which b ∈ (s2, N) and in this equilibrium
AQ2(DA, IA) < AQ2(DA,DA) if and only if u2/u1 > 1/2.
According to point 3, the condition for school 2’s IA to influence applicants’ behavior
is different from the condition for it to benefit from the policy. For instance, consider the
parameter values s1 = s2 = N/4 and u2/u1 = 0.4. Then school 1’s IA is able to influence
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Figure 6: The two dotted lines show the cutoffs under (DA,DA). The two shaded regions
show the admitted students under (DA,IA).
applicants’ behavior but its average applicant quality will worsen. More generally, provided
that 2s1 + s2 < N , there exists a nonvanishing range of u2/u1 ∈ (s1/(N − s2), 1/2) such
that school 2’s IA is influential yet self-defeating.
5.1.2 Competition
Given that u2/u1 > s1/(N−s2), the equilibrium under (DA,IA) has the following simple but
powerful feature: relative to school 2, school 1’s cutoff value must be more stringent. (Or
else, each applicant would strictly prefer to making school 1 as their top choice, violating
the fact that school 1’s cutoff value is less stringent.) This implies that school 1 admits
only among those who specify it as their top choice. Taking into account the property that
b > s2 (Part 3 of Proposition 7), we reckon that neither school will admit any applicant
not specifying it as her top choice. In other words, the outcome under (DA,IA) is exactly
the same as that under (IA,IA). Noting the outcome equivalence of (DA,DA) and (IA,DA),
we conclude that, regardless of school 2’s policy choice, school 1 cannot worsen school 2
through using IA. School 2’s IA is nonpreemptive.
Proposition 8 (Competition) Suppose that α1 = α2 = 0 and that y1 is distributed uni-
formly over the [0,1] interval.
1. If u2/u1 > max {s1/(N − s2), 1/2}, then there is a unique equilibrium outcome, which
is the same as under (DA,IA).
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2. If u2/u1 < max {s1/(N − s2), 1/2}, then there is a unique equilibrium outcome, which
is the same as under (DA,DA).
Proof. Omitted.
According to the first result, when u2/u1 is high enough, school 2 will gain from using
IA, and its use of IA is not deterred by school 1. In fact, school 2’s student intake is invariant
to whether or not school 1 adopts IA. There are two pure strategy equilibria: (DA,IA) and
(IA,IA) and they are outcome equivalent. According to the second point, when u2/u1 is not
high enough, school 2 will not gain from using IA and will not use it. There are two pure
strategy equilibria: (DA,DA) and (IA,DA) and they are outcome equivalent. To conclude,
we have found not only an asymmetry between the two schools regarding the stealing effect
but also the lack of preemptive ability on the part of the popular school.15
5.1.3 More Information
Despite our focus on the quintessential case, we think that the general insights will still hold
when applicants have more information about the rankings among themselves. We illustrate
this with a simple variant. We continue to assume that the two schools care about y1 only.
Assume that each applicant knows whether her y1 is of grade A or grade B and that grade A
is a better grade. Consider the case of identical school preferences and assume that among
N applicants, eN of them belong to grade A applicants and they know it; the rest belong
to grade B applicants and they know it too. Suppose that eN < s1.
Under (DA,DA), applicants still have reporting truthfully as their equilibrium. Under
(DA,IA), grade A applicants are certain that they can enter the same school (school 1), while
Grade B applicants are not. In this case, if u2/u1 is sufficiently high, grade B applicants
will have unilateral incentives to deviate from the truthful equilibrium. More precisely, we
can show that if u2/u1 > (s1 − eN)/(N − s2), the truthful equilibrium is no longer viable;
instead, a number of grade B applicants (b > s2) will make school 2 their top choice. We
can show that AQ2(DA, IA) < AQ2(DA,DA) provided that u2/u1 > 1/2. To say the
least, though the applicants know more about themselves, school 2 can still influence the
applicants’ behavior through and benefit from using IA.16
15Here we assume that applicants’ uncertainty about the ranking among them is because of an information
asymmetry between schools and applicants. We can also think of scenarios in which there is no information
asymmetry associated with applicants’ ranking uncertainty. For instance, in many other places, notably
commonwealth countries in which an applicant’s public examination result in each subject is normally
summarized by a letter grade (or sub-grade). Uncertain about how schools will break ties among students
with the same grade, applicants are also facing a sort of relative ranking uncertainty. (See Erdil and Ergin
(forthcoming) and Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth (2006) on the role of the tie-breaking rule.) As far as
the effect of IA on applicants’ behavior, our results obtained here apply. We cannot, however, be as assertive
regarding the benefits of using IA to the school.
16Likewise, we can show that school 1 does not have an incentive to use IA provided that school 2 does
not use IA, and that school 2’s optimal policy choice is independent of what school 1 will do when both
schools are allowed to pre-commit.
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5.2 Heterogeneous School Preferences
Despite its absence under homogeneous preferences, a preemptive equilibrium by school 1
may exist if school preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous. To see this, we assume that
α1 = 0 and α2 = ∞ such that school 1 cares about the applicants’ first attribute, y1,
and school 2 cares only about their second attribute, y2. This is the most extreme case of
heterogeneous preferences. Under (DA,DA), applicants still report truthfully, and school
1 admits applicants whose y1 ≤ c1 = s1/N and school 2 admits applicants whose (y1, y2)
satisfies y1 > c1 and y2 ≤ c2 = s2/(N − s1), where c1 and c2 are the two cutoffs on y1 and
y2 that the two schools, respectively, set in equilibrium. We have the following proposition
regarding the unilateral incentive to use IA.
Proposition 9 Suppose the α1 = 0, α2 =∞, and (y1, y2) is distributed uniformly over the
[0,1] square.
1. (IA,DA) and (DA,DA) are outcome equivalent.
2. Under (DA,IA), if u2/u1 < s1/(N−s2), there exists a truthful equilibrium; if u2/u1 >
s1/(N − s2), then (a) there does not exist a truthful equilibrium, but (b) there exists a
unique equilibrium, in which b = N and AQ2(DA, IA) < AQ2(DA,DA).
The first result is derived from the fact that school 1 has no incentive to use IA given
that school 2 does not use it. The bandwagon phenomenon in result 2.b is a joint outcome of
school 1’s DA and the two schools’ orthogonal preferences. Because of school 1’s DA, those
applicants who did not specify school 1 as their top choice are not discriminated against by
school 1 when they become available for its selection. Because of the schools’ orthogonal
preferences, these applicants are viewed by school 1 as good as those who specified school 1
as their top choice. As a result, they will be admitted with the same probability by school
1 as if they chose it as their top choice. Foreseeing this, they find it optimal to make school
2 their top choice provided that u2 is sufficiently high. In the identical school preferences
case, on the contrary, those specifying school 2 as their top choice and subsequently declined
by school 2 are of inferior quality from school 1’s point of view and will not be admitted.
This difference leads to a very significant difference in terms of the applicants’ behavior.
Given that b = N , school 2 has all the applicants to select from, and it is not surprising
to see that the average quality of its students will improve. We note in passing that under
(DA,IA) the two schools will have cutoffs c1 = s1/(1 − c2)N and c2 = s2/N , with average
qualities AQ1(DA, IA) = s1/2(1 − s2) and AQ2(DA, IA) = s2/2N . Compared with their
counterparts under (DA,DA), we know that school 1 is worse off while school 2 is better off.
Therefore, the ability to influence applicants’ behavior is equivalent to gaining from the IA
policy.
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We next note that, if u2/u1 > s1/(N−s2) and both schools are allowed to pre-commit to
IA, there are two asymmetric equilibria: (IA,DA) and (DA,IA). The policy pair (IA,IA) is
not an equilibrium because given that the other school uses IA, each school finds it optimal
not to use it, i.e., we have AQ1(DA, IA) < AQ1(IA, IA) and AQ2(IA,DA) < AQ2(IA, IA).
Proposition 10 Suppose that α1 = 0, α2 = ∞, (y1, y2) is distributed uniformly over the
[0,1] square, and u2/u1 < s1/(N −s2). There are two pure strategy equilibria: (IA,DA) and
(DA,IA).
(IA,DA) is a preemptive equilibrium. Not directly benefiting from the use of IA, school
1 can deter school 2 from using IA. Thus, the asymmetry between the two schools that we
have seen under homogenous preferences is somewhat diluted.
5.3 Summary
As in the demand uncertainty model, we have found in this ranking certainty model that
there is a difference between an influential IA policy and a beneficial IA policy, and that
there is an asymmetry between the two schools regarding the stealing motive. Regarding
the preemptive motive, new results have arisen. There is little the popular school can do to
prevent the less popular school from choosing IA when the two schools have like preferences.
When they are sufficiently different, however, the popular school can successfully use IA as
a defensive policy.
6 Concluding Remarks
Misrepresenting preferences on the part of proposers has been documented and analyzed
in admissions schemes, such as the Boston mechanism, in which preferential treatment is
exogenously given. The Gale-Shapley mechanism, however, is acclaimed for its immunity to
this problem. Taken the students-propose-to-schools variant for illustration, the literature
has established that, students still have the incentive to report their preferences truthfully
despite manipulation on the part of schools. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first
to point out this is not generally true: within the Gale-Shapley framework, there still exists
manipulation on the part of schools that leads to misreporting on the part of students. We
think that pointing out this on its own is a contribution of the paper.
Two natural questions arise from this study. What can we do to reduce the scopes and
effects of endogenous preferential treatment? Should endogenous preferential treatment be
banned? Regarding the first question, since immediate acceptance policy has bites only
when applicants face uncertainty, one natural way to mitigate the problem is to reduce
the scope of uncertainty. Demand uncertainty can be reduced by a more thorough survey
on applicants’ preferences before application, while ranking uncertainty can be reduced
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by providing finer exam grades and scores (in the case of commonwealth countries) or
postponing the application period until applicants know their exam scores (in the case of
several Chinese provinces). Moreover, since public availability of past admissions records
strengthens schools’ long run reputational concerns, the education agency can judiciously
reduce the release of such records for public access. In this case, schools’ pre-commitments
are discredited and have no bites provided that applicants no longer believe in them.
The second question is more difficult to answer. In our model, we assumed that schools
adopted preferential treatment simply out of a strategic consideration, and the motivational
consideration was completely neglected. When students’ motivations and commitments
are important to success in their study, schools naturally want to admit students who like
them most, other things being equal.17 If a school adopts preferential treatment out of
this consideration, there is nothing wrong with it and banning preferential treatment does
not seem justifiable. To answer the question satisfactorily, therefore, it requires studying a
model that also takes into account the motivational consideration. We hope that this issue
can be tackled in future studies.
Dissatisfied with the centralized admissions system, either because of a strategic con-
sideration or because of a motivational consideration, schools may opt to use alternative
channels, such as early admissions or admissions that are run parallel to centralized ad-
missions. We think that the interactions between centralized admissions and alternative
admissions channels are an issue warranted future studies. The literature of college admis-
sions and school choice can then be linked to that of early contracting (see, e.g., Li and
Rosen, 1998; Roth and Xing, 1994; and Suen, 2000).
17The emphasis of one’s motivation in one’s performance and its impact on the design of organizations
have received increasing attention lately (see, e.g., Hart and Moore 2002, and Besley and Ghatak 2005). This
line of studies suggests that the motivational consideration pointed out here is worth further investigation.
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Appendix A:
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Partition applicants into three groups according to where they end up under the
truthful outcome: those who get admitted to school 1 (with measure s1), those who get
admitted to school 2 (with measure s2), and the rest. Call them group 1, group 2, and
group 3 applicants, respectively. Given the policy pair (i, j) in which at least one of i and j
equals IA, consider the following strategies: each group 1 applicant specifies school 1 as their
top choice, and each group 2 applicant specifies school 2 as top choice. (It does not matter
what the rest will do.) We first note that school k considers every group k applicant strictly
better than every group 3 applicant, k = 1, 2. (Otherwise, it should have given a place to
some group 3 applicant under (DA,DA).) Therefore, in the first round of the Gale-Shapley
mechanism, school k will keep all group k applicants. Each school that uses IA will simply
admit this group of applicants and will not proceed to the second round. The school, if any,
that uses DA will find the applicants it retained in the first round to be strictly better than
any applicant whom the school can newly consider in the second round. As a result, the
mechanism terminates with school k admitting all group k applicants, k = 1, 2. Given the
aforementioned prescription for applicants, it is clear that no applicant can benefit from a
unilateral deviation; otherwise, she would have benefitted from a unilateral deviation under
(DA,DA). Thus, the truthful outcome is still feasible as an equilibrium outcome under (i, j).
To show that this is the unique equilibrium outcome, it suffices to note that the truthful
outcome is stable and hence there do not exist an unmatched pair of school and an applicant
that prefer one other more than what they are entitled to under the truthful outcome.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Step 1: We first note that n(A) = n(B) = n(C). Denote this quantity by Q. We
also note that
m(A) =
1
2
µ
s1
μ11N
+
s1
μ21N
¶
, m(B) =
s1 + s2
N
− x
2
and m(C) =
s1 + s2
N
+
x
2
.
Substituting all these into (8) and with some manipulation, we obtain
∆
¡
μ11, μ
2
1
¢
=
π2Q
2
µ
s1
μ11N
+
s1
μ21N
¶
− π2Q
µ
s1 + s2
N
¶
+Q
s2
N
µ
1− μ
2
1
μ11
¶³
π1 +
π2
2
´
=
s1Q
N
∙
π2
2
µ
1
μ11
+
1
μ21
¶
− π2
µ
s1 + s2
s1
¶
+
µ
1− μ
2
1
μ11
¶³
π1 +
π2
2
´¸
,
Step 2: ∂∆
¡
μ11, μ21
¢
/∂μ21 < 0.
Step 3: Note that the lowest possible value of μ21 is just s1/ (s1 + s2). Substituting it
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into ∆
¡
μ11, μ21
¢
, and after regrouping, yields
∆
µ
μ11,
s1
s1 + s2
¶
=
s1Q
N
∙
π2
2
µ
1
μ11
+
s1 + s2
s1
¶
− π2β +
µ
1− s1
s1 + s2
1
μ11
¶³
π1 +
π2
2
´¸
=
s1Q
N
π2
2
∙µ
s2
s1
− 2π1
π2
¶µ
1
μ11
− s1 + s2
s1
¶¸
.
Hence, ∆
¡
μ11, s1/ (s1 + s2)
¢
> 0 if and only if (i) s2/s1 > 2π1/π2 and μ11 < s1/ (s1 + s2)
(rejected) or (ii) s2/s1 < 2π1/π2 and μ11 > s1/ (s1 + s2).
Step 4: Using step 2 and step 3, as well as continuity, we establish that there exist
parameters in which ∆
¡
μ11, μ21
¢
> 0 if s2/s1 < 2π1/π2 and there do not if s2/s1 ≥ 2π1/π2.
Step 5: In the above derivation, as well as the exposition in the main text, we assumed
that the right boundary of region A is on the left hand side of the left boundary of region
B. It may not be the case, and there may be "overlapping" of the two regions. It can be
easily shown that, however, all the calculations in this proof, as well as the proposition, still
go through. The trick is that we can add the overlapping region to both the gain and loss
in state 2 so that the specifications of Region A and Region B that we used in defining ∆
become without loss of generality whether or not there is overlapping of the two regions.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. We now reckon how school 2’s composition of admitted applicants is changed under
(IA,IA) relative to (DA,IA). We first note that, during this exercise, in state 2, school 1
admits those type 1 applicants with y1 ∈ V ≡ ((s1 + s2) /N, (s1 + s2) /N + x0), replacing
those type 2 applicants with y1 ∈ T . Here
x0 = x
¡
1/μ21 − 1
¢
Back to state 1, school 2 needs to replace those type 1 applicants with y1 ∈ T by applicants
with y1 > (s1 + s2) /N . Those applicants will be solely of type 2 applicants if type 2
applicants with y1 ∈ V are sufficiently numerous for the replacement and will be of both
types otherwise.
Case 1: If the replacement is solely by type 2 applicants, then the replacement actually
comes from type 2 applicants with y1 ∈ ((s1 + s2) /N, (s1 + s2) /N + z) where
z = x(1/μ12 − 1).
This case happens when μ21 < μ
1
2.
Case 2: If the replacement is by both types of applicants, then the replacement actually
comes from type 2 applicants with y1 ∈ ((s1 + s2) /N, (s1 + s2) /N+z) and type 1 applicants
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with y1 ∈ ((s1 + s2) /N + x0, (s1 + s2) /N + z)), where
z − x0 = μ11x− μ12x0.
This case happens when μ21 > μ12.
Now return to Γ
¡
μ11, μ
2
1
¢
. Noting that n(A) = n(B), denoted by Q, and n(B0) = n(C) =
μ11n(B). Note also that
m(A) =
1
2
µ
s1
μ11N
+
s1
μ21N
¶
, m(B0) = m(b) =
s1 + s2
N
− x
2
and m(C) =
s1 + s2
N
+Rx,
where R is a positive term. We thus have
Γ
¡
μ11, μ
2
1
¢
= Q
£
π2m(A)−
¡
π2 + π1μ11
¢
m(B) + π1μ11m(C)
¤
= Q
∙
π2
2
µ
s1
μ11N
+
s1
μ21N
¶
−
¡
π2 + π1μ11
¢µs1 + s2
N
− x
2
¶
+ π1μ11
µ
s1 + s2
N
+Rx
¶¸
Note that the lowest possible value of μ21 is just s1/ (s1 + s2). Substituting it into
∆
¡
μ11, μ21
¢
, and after regrouping, yields
Γ
µ
μ11,
s1
s1 + s2
¶
=
µ
−s1 + s2
s1
+
1
μ11
¶µ
s2
s1
− μ11(1 + 2R)
π1
π2
¶
.
Hence, ∆
¡
μ11, s1/ (s1 + s2)
¢
> 0 if and only if (i) s2/s1 > μ11(1 + 2R)π1/π2 and μ
1
1 <
s1/ (s1 + s2) (rejected) or (ii) s2/s1 < μ11(1+2R)π1/π2 and μ
1
1 > s1/ (s1 + s2). Since the sec-
ond condition is always satisfied, we can just focus on the first one. Hence,∆
¡
μ11, s1/ (s1 + s2)
¢
>
0 if and only if
s2
s1
< μ11(1 + 2R)
π1
π2
. (A1)
If Case 1 is the case, then R = z/2x, (A1) becomes s2/s1 < μ11/(1 − μ11)π1/π2. If
Case 2 is the case, then given μ11 and μ21, R is bounded below by zero, and in particular
R > x0/2x =
¡
1/μ21 − 1
¢
/2 = μ11/2(1−μ11). Hence, taken into account continuity, a sufficient
condition for existence of the preemptive equilibrium is that s2/s1 < μ11/(1− μ11)× π1/π2.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. To see this, suppose that all other applicants report truthfully. Then each applicant
is admitted by school 1 with s1/N probability and by school 2 with s2/N probability,
obtaining an expected utility of s1u1/N + s2u2/N . By unilaterally deviating to choosing
school 2 as her top choice, the applicant is certain to be admitted by school 2, obtaining
a utility of u2. If u2/u1 < s1/(N − s2), such a deviation is unprofitable and the truthful
equilibrium remains to be viable–-school 2’s IA is simply irrelevant. If u2/u1 > s1/(N−s2),
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on the other hand, the deviation is profitable and the truthful equilibrium is not viable.
Instead, the equilibrium is characterized by a pair, a and b ≡ N − a, where a (b) is the
number of applicants making school 1 (2) their top choice. Intuitively, the higher u2/u1, the
greater the equilibrium b is. Moreover, when b is sufficiently large, the use of IA by school
2 indeed improves the average quality of its applicants.
Here we prove 3; the other parts are straightforward. We first note that, in equilibrium,
school 1’s cutoff value must be more stringent than school 2’s cutoff value; or else, each
applicant would strictly prefer to make school 1 her top choice, violating the fact that
school 1’s cutoff value is less stringent. This implies that the applicant who makes school 2
her top choice and is subsequently declined by school 2 will not be admitted by school 1. We
next note that b, the number of applicants making school 2 their top choice, must exceed s2.
(Suppose not. Then, by making school 2 the top choice, an applicant is certain to receive
a utility of u2—she is admitted by school 2 for certain. By making school 1 her top choice,
the applicant is admitted by school 1 with probability p = s1/(N − b) and by school 2 with
probability q = (1− p)(s2 − b)/(N − s1 − b). The equilibrium dictates that u2 = pu1 + qu2,
or u2/u1 = s1/(N − s2), which is contradictory.) Given these two facts, we learn that,
in equilibrium, no applicant will be admitted by a school that she did not specify as her
top choice. Hence, indifference between the two strategies means: s2u2/b = s1u1/(N − b),
implying
b =
s2u2N
s1u1 + s2u2
.
To show the last result, we first note that AQ2(DA, IA) = (s1u1 + s2u2) /2u2N . Under
(DA,DA), all applicants choose school 1 as their top choice. Then, school 1 admits those
applicants with y1 < c1 ≡ s1/N and school 2 admits those applicants with < y1 ∈ (c1, c2)
where c2 ≡ (s1 + s2)/N . As a result, AQ2(DA,DA) = (2s1 + s2)/2N , which is strictly
greater than AQ2(DA, IA) if and only if u2/u1 > 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 9.
Proof. We first note that it must be the case that b > s2. Suppose not. By specifying
school 1 as top choice, an applicant is admitted to school 1 with probability s1/a and to
school 2 with probability (s2 − b)/a, resulting in a utility of s1u1/a + (s2 − b)u2/a. By
specifying school 2 as her top choice, an applicant is certain to be admitted to school 2 and
obtain a utility of u2. But
u2 >
s1
a
u1 +
s2 − b
a
u2 ⇔
u2
u1
>
s1
N − s2
.
Thus everybody indeed wants to make school 2 the top choice, and this is contradictory to
the claim that, in equilibrium, b ≤ s2. Given that b > s2, it is easy to reckon that school 1
will set a cutoff value of c1 = s1/(N − s2). By reporting 1 as her top choice, an applicant is
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admitted to school 1 with probability c1 and to school 2 with probability zero; by reporting
2 as her top choice, the applicant is admitted to school 2 with probability s2/b and to school
1 with probability (1− s2/b)c1. Hence, making 2 as the top choice is strictly better if and
only if
c1u1 <
s2
b
u2 +
³
1− s2
b
´
c1u1 ⇔
u2
u1
> c1 =
s1
N − s2
,
suggesting that, in equilibrium, b = N !
Proof of Proposition 10.
Proof. Under (IA,IA) in equilibrium, the numbers of applicants who specify school 1
and who specify school 2 as their top choice are a = s1u1/(s1u1 + s2u2) > s1 and b =
s2u2/(s1u1 + s2u2) > s2, respectively. Moreover, the average qualities of the admitted
applicants are
AQ1(IA, IA) =
s1u1 + s2u2
2u1
and AQ2(IA, IA) =
s1u1 + s2u2
2u2
.
By simple comparison, we reckon that AQ1(DA, IA) < AQ1(IA, IA) and AQ2(IA,DA) <
AQ2(IA, IA).
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